Repairable Transitions: Institutional Maintenance, Dispute Recurrence, and the Social Durability of Renewable Energy Deployment

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ABSTRACT

Renewable energy transitions are widely described through targets, project pipelines, and technological substitution, but the lived experience of deployment is frequently shaped by recurring disputes, partial settlements, and periodic breakdowns in trust. In many settings, the decisive constraint is not whether a given project can be approved, but whether institutions can keep projects governable over long lifecycles as conditions, knowledge, and political expectations change. This paper advances a social science theory of repairable transitions. It treats conflict and revision not as exceptional deviations from a planned pathway, but as normal features of deployment in pluralist societies under nonstationary ecological and infrastructural conditions. The papers contribution is a conceptual model of institutional maintenance in renewable deployment, emphasizing how governance systems repeatedly perform repair work when commitments, evidence, or authority arrangements fail to hold. Repair work is analyzed as a patterned set of practices that re-stabilize decision meanings, redistribute responsibility, and rebuild confidence without requiring full consensus. The argument distinguishes material repair (changes to project design and mitigation), procedural repair (changes to decision and review routines), and interpretive repair (changes to the frames and standards through which impacts and benefits are evaluated). The analysis shows how delegation to intermediaries, the politics of urgency, and uneven capacities to influence regulators can intensify repair demands and make repair more contentious. The paper concludes with institutional design implications that prioritize transparency calibrated to contestability, standing for post-approval review, and portfolio-level learning arrangements that reduce repeated crisis cycles while preserving democratic disagreement.

KEYWORDS

1. Introduction

Large-scale decarbonization is increasingly pursued through the accelerated construction of renewable energy infrastructures that transform landscapes, administrative routines, and the social meaning of energy provision [1]. Public debates often treat this transformation as a matter of speed and scale: how quickly capacity can be built, how much can be connected, how far costs can fall. Yet the practical pathway of deployment is more frequently shaped by whether governance systems can absorb disagreement without repeatedly collapsing into stalemate. Communities contest projects for reasons that include ecological concern, distributive fairness, place attachment, and distrust in follow-through [2]. Developers and system planners seek predictability to mobilize finance and to coordinate grid integration. Regulators and ministries balance mandates that are internally inconsistent over time, particularly when ecological

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

Figure 1 High-level lifecycle view of a *repairable transition*: breakdowns recur after approval and are routed into material, procedural, and interpretive repair to keep long-lived renewable projects socially workable under changing baselines and contestation.

sensitivity collides with climate and security objectives. Under these conditions, renewable transitions should be analyzed as processes that require ongoing institutional maintenance rather than as linear rollouts that occasionally encounter friction.

A maintenance lens begins with a simple empirical observation: controversies do not neatly end when a permit is issued [3]. Disputes recur after approval through monitoring debates, claims of noncompliance, reinterpretations of conditions, and political struggles over whether rules should be tightened or relaxed. Likewise, prolonged deliberation does not necessarily produce durable agreement; it can produce fatigue, cynicism, and strategic behavior. These patterns suggest that the main governance task is not merely to decide, but to keep decisions socially workable over time. Decisions must remain intelligible and revisable in ways that actors accept as legitimate, even when they disagree with outcomes [4]. Without such capacities, institutions confront a cycle of breakdowns that require ad hoc interventions, and deployment becomes governed by crisis rather than by routine.

This paper proposes the concept of repairable transitions to capture this dynamic. A repairable transition is one in which governance systems are designed to accommodate disagreement, uncertainty, and revision as normal conditions, and in which institutions possess routines that can repair breakdowns without redefining every dispute as a legitimacy emergency. The point is not to normalize conflict as desirable, but to recognize that conflict is inevitable when infrastructure changes are distributed unevenly and when ecological and social baselines shift [5]. The practical question becomes how governance systems can route conflict into manageable forms of repair rather than into escalating forms of confrontation.

The papers central claim is that repair work is a core but under-theorized feature of renewable deployment. Repair work refers to the practical labor through which institutions re-stabilize projects and policies after breakdowns in commitments, evidence credibility, or authority alignment. Repair work can involve modifying mitigation measures, adjusting operational constraints, revising monitoring protocols, redefining evidentiary standards, reallocating responsibilities among agencies and private actors, or creating new review forums [6]. Repair work is not merely technical. It has distributive consequences, it reshapes who has standing, and it changes whose interpretations become authoritative. Because of this, repair work is itself politically contested. Yet the existence of repair work, and the institutional capacity to perform it credibly, often determines whether deployment accelerates or stalls [7].

A repairable transition perspective also reframes what counts as success in deployment governance. Success cannot be measured only by speed or by procedural completeness. A rapid approval that produces sustained post-approval conflict and repeated intervention is not necessarily successful governance, even if a project is ultimately built. Conversely, a slower approval that yields credible monitoring, clear revision pathways, and stable relationships may reduce long-run delay by preventing litigation and crisis-driven rule changes [8]. In this sense, social durability is a performance dimension distinct from short-term throughput.

The argument developed here is conceptual and oriented



Figure 2 Typology of repair work: material changes (on-the-ground design and mitigation), procedural changes (review and enforcement routines), and interpretive changes (standards, baselines, and evidentiary rules) jointly sustain social durability when conflicts and uncertainties recur across project lifecycles.

toward social science explanation rather than toward a single national case. Its scope is the governance of renewable deployment in contexts where multiple mandates coexist and where affected publics contest the terms of infrastructure change [9]. The analysis draws on institutionalist sensibilities about how rules and meanings stabilize, on governance scholarship about delegation and intermediation, and on sociological insights about maintenance and repair as forms of work that keep systems functioning. The paper does not assume that consensus is attainable or necessary. It assumes pluralism and seeks to understand which institutional arrangements allow pluralism to coexist with sustained build-out.

The structure departs from the typical narrative that moves from problem statement to policy prescriptions through a single mechanism [10]. Instead, it proceeds by reconstructing the recurring situations that generate repair demands and by specifying how different forms of repair interact. The next section establishes the deployment setting that makes repair inevitable, emphasizing nonstationarity, cumulative effects, and the long temporal horizon of commitments. The following section develops a typology of repair work and explains how repair is triggered when governance promises fail to hold. The third section analyzes repair in systems where evidence production and oversight are increasingly delegated to intermediaries, focusing on how intermediation shapes credibility and accountability [11]. The fourth section examines how persuasion and unequal influence shape repair pathways, including how certain actors gain capacity to frame repair as technical adjustment rather than as political concession. The fifth section develops design implications for building repairable governance arrangements that preserve contestability while reducing repeated crisis cycles. The conclusion summarizes the contribution and identifies limits.

2. Why Repair Becomes Inevitable in Renewable Deployment

Renewable deployment is embedded in conditions that make stable, once-and-for-all bargains difficult [12]. Projects operate across decades, while policy priorities, ecological baselines, and grid conditions change. Even when an approval is based on extensive assessment, those assessments rely on assumptions about future behavior, cumulative build-out, and mitigation effectiveness that cannot be fully verified in advance. Communities and environmental organizations often interpret this uncertainty as a reason for stronger precaution, while proponents interpret it as a reason to proceed with adaptive management. In practice, both stances can coexist only if institutions can implement credible post-approval monitoring and can revise commitments without erasing accountability [13]. Where such capacity is weak, actors treat approval as irreversible and therefore contest it intensely upfront.

Cumulative effects intensify repair demands because harm and controversy are often portfolio phenomena rather than single-project phenomena. A single project may appear manageable, while the aggregate of many projects transforms landscapes, ecosystems, and social expectations. Cumulative impacts also create responsibility ambiguity [14]. Multiple developers, agencies, and contractors contribute to outcomes, and no single actor is obviously responsible for corridor-level conditions. Communities often respond by treating each new project as a precedent that reduces future leverage, increasing resistance even to projects with substantial mitigation commitments. Authorities respond by seeking more documentation, more stringent conditions, or more conservative interpretations, which can reduce investment certainty and provoke political conflict. Repair is therefore not a rare response to a singular failure; it is a predictable feature of portfolio expansion [15].

Nonstationarity amplifies these dynamics. Climate-driven



Figure 3 A rule-bound response ladder couples monitoring to action: observed signals cross defined thresholds, activating targeted mitigation, review, or enforcement, followed by transparent updates that prevent recurring disputes from escalating into repeated legitimacy crises.

changes affect wind patterns, fire regimes, flooding risks, and ecological migration patterns, shifting what normal looks like and altering the impacts of infrastructure. Grid systems, too, change as penetration increases and as congestion and reliability constraints evolve [16]. A mitigation regime that appears adequate under one operating regime may become inadequate under another. Operational constraints can change due to curtailment patterns or system security needs, altering local noise, visual exposure, or ecological disturbance profiles. These are not merely technical changes; they reshape whether communities view promised benefits and mitigations as delivered. When institutions lack routines for updating commitments transparently, nonstationarity becomes a legitimacy pressure that triggers conflict [17].

The deployment setting also includes fragmented authority. Energy transitions frequently involve multiple ministries, regulators, utilities, and planning bodies with overlapping responsibilities and different logics of justification. One arena may prioritize system reliability, another ecological integrity, another cost containment, another local planning fairness. Fragmentation can be productive by enabling specialized oversight, but it can also generate inconsistent signals and unclear responsibility for follow-through [18]. In such environments, repair often takes the form of inter-arena bargaining: shifting responsibilities, creating coordination forums, redefining who has authority to interpret conditions, and renegotiating standards of proof.

Adaptation and resilience add another layer. Renewables are sometimes framed as contributing to resilience through decentralization and diversification, but governance practice can remain predominantly mitigation-oriented, with uneven incorporation of adaptation objectives into actual deployment commitments. A comparative qualitative study of how renewable energy is incorporated into climate adaptation policies highlights the need to align renewable deployment with mitigation objectives while considering climate-related concerns and the realities of implementation [19]. The implication for repairable transitions is that resilience framing can increase the stakes of follow-through [20]. When resilience is invoked, stakeholders reasonably ask how reliability under hazard conditions will be managed, how local benefits relate to system-level resilience, and what happens when hazard events force operational changes. If institutions do not treat these questions as governable through clear commitments and review routines, adaptation rhetoric becomes a repair liability: it expands the space for disappointment and contestation when realities diverge from claims.

The inevitability of repair follows from the interaction of these features. Long horizons make learning necessary [21]. Cumulative effects make project-by-project governance insufficient. Nonstationarity makes baseline assumptions fragile. Fragmented authority makes responsibility ambiguous. Expanded narratives about resilience increase the scope of what is promised [22]. Repair becomes the mechanism through which institutions attempt to restore governability under these conditions. The next section defines repair work more precisely and explains how it operates as a patterned form of governance labor.



Figure 4 Persuasion and unequal influence shape how uncertainty is translated into decisions. Embedding transparent, rule-bound triggers reduces discretionary drift, making it harder for narrative dominance alone to determine which repairs are treated as legitimate and enforceable.



Figure 5 Institutional design bundle for repairability: standing after approval, monitoring coupled to response, calibrated transparency, portfolio-level learning for cumulative effects, assurance-oriented delegation, and traceable reason-giving together reduce repeated breakdown cycles while preserving legitimate disagreement.

3. A Typology of Repair Work in Contested Transitions

Repairable transitions require more than a general commitment to participation or transparency. They require institutions that can diagnose breakdowns and can enact specific forms of repair that re-stabilize governance without demanding consensus [23]. This section develops a typology of repair work that clarifies what institutions actually do when deployment arrangements fail to hold.

Material repair refers to changes in physical design, siting micro-decisions, and mitigation measures. Material repair includes actions such as modifying layouts, altering operational regimes, enhancing mitigation infrastructure, or redesigning monitoring equipment. Material repair is often treated as the most concrete form of response because it changes what is on the ground [24]. Yet material repair is not self-justifying. It must be interpreted as adequate, and it must be embedded in accountability routines that ensure it is implemented and maintained. Material repair is therefore intertwined with interpretive and procedural repair [25].

Procedural repair refers to changes in how decisions are made, reviewed, and enforced. Procedural repair can involve adding review windows, creating new coordination committees, specifying enforcement steps, or revising consultation routines to address perceived exclusions. Procedural repair is often triggered when actors experience existing procedures as either too permissive or too obstructive. The maintenance challenge is that procedural repair can create new burdens and can be experienced as rule instability if it is imposed abruptly [26]. Repairable transitions require procedural repair that is rule-bound and that preserves predictability while expanding

Table 1 Core concepts in repairable renewable energy transitions

Concept	Short description	Indicative question
Repairable transition	Deployment pathway in which disagreement, uncertainty, and revision are treated as normal and governable	How can we revise without crisis?
Institutional maintenance	Ongoing work to keep rules, meanings, and routines socially workable as conditions change	Who maintains decisions after approval?
Social durability	Ability of decisions to remain legitimate and intelligible under evolving ecological, social, and political baselines	When do approvals keep working socially?
Crisis cycle	Pattern in which disputes repeatedly trigger breakdown, ad hoc intervention, and reactive rule changes	How often do conflicts force emergency fixes?
Legitimacy emergency	Situation where disagreement is framed as a fundamental breakdown in authority rather than a manageable dispute	When does contestation threaten institutional authority?

contestability where needed. Procedural repair is also the main way institutions create standing after approval, which is crucial for reducing front-loaded conflict.

Interpretive repair refers to changes in the meanings and standards through which impacts and benefits are evaluated. Interpretive repair includes redefining what counts as significant impact, what thresholds are acceptable, what baselines are valid, and what evidence is sufficient to trigger response [27]. Interpretive repair occurs when stakeholders contest how categories are applied, and when officials must justify decisions under shifting pressures. Interpretive repair is often invisible in public debate because it appears as technical adjustment or as guidance revision, but it can be politically decisive because it changes which claims are recognized as legitimate.

These repair forms are triggered by breakdowns that occur in different parts of the deployment lifecycle. A breakdown can occur at the point of approval when stakeholders reject the evidentiary basis or perceive unfair distribution [28]. It can occur during construction when unanticipated impacts appear. It can occur during operation when monitoring reveals exceedances or when promised benefits are not delivered. It can occur in the broader policy environment when targets change, when a hazard event shifts public expectations, or when a scandal undermines trust in oversight. Repairable transitions require that institutions treat these breakdowns as normal and develop pathways for response that do not depend on improvisation [29].

Repair is also constrained by asymmetries in resources and expertise. Some communities can hire experts, engage lawyers, and sustain long campaigns; others cannot. Some developers can absorb redesign costs; others cannot. Agencies differ in capacity and in political insulation [30]. These asymmetries affect which repair is feasible and which repair is perceived as fair. Maintenance is therefore not simply administrative. It is distributive governance: repair choices allocate costs, risks, and time.

An important feature of repair work is that it can either stabilize trust or deepen cynicism depending on whether it is seen as sincere and enforceable [31]. A mitigation upgrade that is announced but not monitored is a symbolic repair that may backfire. A procedural revision that increases paperwork without clarifying enforcement can be experienced as avoidance. Interpretive repair that shifts standards without clear reasoning can be experienced as arbitrariness [32]. Repairable transitions therefore require repair that is traceable, meaning actors can see what was promised, what changed, why it changed, and how change is enforced.

Repair can also be anticipatory rather than reactive. Institutions can design projects and policies with built-in repair capacities, such as scheduled review windows, independent monitoring validation, and predefined response triggers. Anticipatory repair reduces the intensity of conflict because stakeholders know that revision is possible without requiring escalation [33]. It also reduces investment risk because revision is governed by rules rather than by crisis. The key is to make repair legitimate as part of the institutional routine rather than as an admission of failure.

The typology suggests that repairable transitions depend heavily on how evidence is produced and validated, because evidence is the medium through which material repairs are assessed, procedural repairs are justified, and interpretive repairs are stabilized. The next section examines the evidence dimension by focusing on delegation and intermediation, which

Table 2 Structural sources of inevitable repair in renewable deployment

Structural feature	Mechanism generating breakdowns	Implication for repair work
Long project horizons	Assumptions about impacts, mitigation effectiveness, and benefits cannot be fully verified ex ante	Need for credible post-approval monitoring and revision pathways
Cumulative effects	Portfolio-level ecological and social impacts exceed what is visible in single-project assessments	Demand for corridor- and portfolio-level repair mechanisms
Nonstationarity	Changing climate, grid conditions, and baselines alter impacts and operational profiles over time	Requirement to update commitments and thresholds transparently
Fragmented authority	Overlapping mandates and logics among agencies create inconsistent signals and responsibilities	Necessity of inter-arena coordination and authority realignment
Resilience narratives	Expanded promises about reliability and adaptation raise expectations about follow-through	Pressure to operationalize resilience claims in concrete commitments

increasingly organize how renewable deployment is assessed and monitored [34].

4. Delegated Oversight and the Credibility of Repair

In many regulatory systems, the production of evidence about impacts and compliance is heavily delegated to private intermediaries. Consultants prepare environmental and planning assessments, contractors conduct monitoring, and specialized firms provide technical validation. Delegation is often defended as necessary, given the complexity of projects and the limited capacity of public agencies. Yet delegation shapes repairability by influencing whether evidence is trusted, whether responsibilities are clear, and whether response can be coordinated [35].

A key maintenance challenge is that delegated oversight can create credibility gaps. Communities may distrust monitoring conducted under developer contracts, even when methods are rigorous, because incentives are perceived as misaligned. Developers may distrust community-generated claims because they appear anecdotal or strategically framed. Regulators may rely on intermediaries because they lack internal capacity to evaluate evidence independently [36]. In such settings, repair demands intensify because actors do not share a baseline of credible observation. Without credible observation, breakdowns become interpretive battles rather than correctable deviations.

Delegation also shifts the regulators role. Instead of acting primarily as an enforcer, regulators often become coordinators of networks that include private entities performing quasi-regulatory tasks [37]. A qualitative study of privatizing environmental governance describes how delegating regulatory responsibilities to private actors can expand capacity while raising concerns about transparency, accountability, and the long-term independence of public oversight, especially in compliance monitoring and policy development [38]. This finding matters for repairable transitions because repair relies on the ability to diagnose failures and to impose credible response. If oversight independence is questioned, then even genuine repairs can be interpreted as strategic performance. If private entities increasingly shape standards and interpretations, interpretive repair may drift toward what is convenient rather than what is legitimate, provoking backlash and renewed conflict.

The maintenance implications are not that delegation should be rejected [39]. The implication is that repairable governance requires explicit design of delegated roles. Evidence systems must include credible validation mechanisms that separate measurement from adjudication. Monitoring must be linked to enforceable response pathways that do not depend entirely on the goodwill of the monitored entity. Independence safeguards, conflict-of-interest rules, and transparent method disclosure can reduce credibility gaps [40]. Public agencies require at least enough internal expertise to interpret evidence and to contest intermediary claims when necessary. Otherwise, the governance system becomes dependent on private expertise not only for data but for meaning, weakening the states capacity to perform interpretive repair in a legitimate manner.

Delegation also affects procedural repair [41]. When controversy arises, agencies may respond by commissioning additional studies or external reviews. This can be a genuine attempt at repair, but it can also function as deferral if it does not clarify what the new evidence will change and who will act on it. Repairable transitions require that procedural repair be connected to action: additional studies should have defined decision consequences, and review processes should have standing and timelines that preserve legitimacy without enabling indefinite stalling.

Another risk is that delegation can concentrate repair capacity among actors with access to specialized expertise [42].

Table 3 Typology of repair work in contested energy transitions

Mode of repair	Primary focus	Illustrative instruments
Material repair	Physical configuration of projects, mitigation measures, and operational regimes	Layout changes, curtailment rules, mitigation upgrades, new monitoring devices
Procedural repair	Rules and routines for decision-making, review, and enforcement	Added review windows, coordination committees, revised consultation protocols
Interpretive repair	Frames, standards, and evidentiary thresholds used to judge impacts and benefits	Guidance revisions, redefined significance thresholds, updated baselines
Anticipatory repair	Built-in capacity to adjust without crisis	Predefined triggers, adaptive management clauses, scheduled rule reviews
Symbolic repair	Gestures that respond rhetorically but not substantively to breakdowns	Unenforced conditions, non-binding commitments, opaque apologies

Well-resourced developers can produce sophisticated mitigation packages and can mobilize consultants quickly. Communities with fewer resources may struggle to contest evidence or to propose alternative repairs, making them more likely to rely on oppositional tactics such as litigation or political mobilization. This dynamic can reduce social durability by amplifying perceptions of unequal voice. A repairable system therefore needs mechanisms that level the evidentiary playing field, such as independent public-interest expertise resources, standardized public reporting, and accessible summaries that allow non-specialists to understand what is at stake [43].

Finally, delegated oversight interacts with the temporal logic of repair. Evidence often arrives on reporting cycles that are misaligned with the moments when affected publics need reassurance. Repairable transitions require time-sensitive disclosure practices that provide timely signals of compliance and deviation. The goal is not to flood publics with raw data, but to provide credible, interpretable indicators that demonstrate that conditions are being monitored and that response is real [44]. When institutions provide such signals, they reduce the incentive for actors to treat every uncertainty as existential.

Delegated oversight thus shapes the credibility of repair and the durability of trust. Yet evidence systems are not only technical; they are political because they determine who can persuade regulators and how. The next section examines persuasion and influence as forces that shape repair pathways, particularly under conditions of uneven resources [45].

5. Persuasion, Unequal Influence, and the Politics of Acceptable Repair

Repair work is rarely a purely administrative adjustment. It is negotiated among actors with different capacities to frame problems and solutions. Some actors can present their preferred repairs as technical necessities, while others are forced to present their concerns as moral claims. This imbalance shapes which repairs are considered feasible and legitimate [46].

A central arena of influence is the relationship between innovators, developers, and regulators. Developers do not merely submit applications; they engage in continuous persuasion to shape how regulators interpret uncertainty, what standards are applied, and which mitigation strategies are deemed sufficient. This is particularly salient when technologies or project forms are treated as unusual or risky, and when regulators lack precedent. Research on pitching to regulators in the context of niche innovation emphasizes that persuasive framing can influence how niches secure regulatory support and that well-resourced actors may be advantaged because they can pitch more effectively and navigate institutional power, potentially narrowing the innovation landscape [47]. In repairable transition terms, this suggests that repair pathways can become skewed toward repairs that are legible within dominant regulatory narratives and toward actors who can translate repair into persuasive packages [48].

Persuasion shapes interpretive repair. If a developer successfully frames a deviation as minor and manageable, regulators may treat it as a technical adjustment rather than as a breach that requires sanction. If opponents successfully frame the same deviation as evidence of systemic unreliability, regulators may tighten standards and expand monitoring [49]. Both outcomes are possible, and the difference may depend less on the underlying fact pattern than on which frames resonate with institutional missions and political pressures. Repairable transitions therefore require procedures that reduce the discretionary space in which persuasion substitutes for accountable adjudication. Clear triggers, independent validation, and transparent reasoning can reduce the degree to which repair outcomes depend on narrative dominance.

Unequal influence also shapes procedural repair [50]. Actors

Table 4 Typical breakdown points across the renewable project lifecycle

Lifecycle phase	Common breakdowns	Primary repair lever	If unaddressed
Pre-approval	Disputes over evidence credibility, distributional fairness, and siting	Procedural repair (participation, assessment scope)	Front-loaded opposition and litigation
Construction	Unanticipated local impacts, noncompliance with conditions, disrupted expectations	Material repair (design tweaks, mitigation changes)	Entrenched local distrust
Operation	Exceedances, monitoring disputes, evolving cumulative effects	Combination of material and interpretive repair	Recurrent complaints and interventions
Policy shifts	New targets, hazard events, or political realignments	Interpretive and procedural repair at portfolio scale	Abrupt rule changes and investment uncertainty
Decommissioning / repowering	Contestation over end-of-life responsibilities and landscape futures	Procedural repair (clear end-of-life regimes)	Perception of abandoned responsibilities

with privileged access can lobby for streamlined processes or for exemptions, framing procedural repair as efficiency and urgency. Opponents may demand additional procedures, framing repair as diligence and precaution. Without credible post-approval standing, both sides treat procedure as the main lever, and procedural repair becomes a proxy battle for power. Repairability requires shifting the battleground away from procedure alone by making enforcement and revision credible [51]. When standing and response are real, actors have less incentive to fight for maximal procedural leverage at the front end, and procedural repair can become more targeted.

Persuasion interacts with the politics of urgency. Decarbonization urgency can be used to justify accelerating approvals and accepting uncertainty. This can be legitimate when governance systems can correct course through monitoring and revision [52]. It becomes contentious when urgency is invoked to foreclose contestation and when post-approval repair capacity is weak. In such cases, urgency narratives increase the intensity of opposition because communities anticipate that repair will not occur or will occur only under crisis. Repairable transitions require that urgency be paired with visible repair capacity, so that proceeding under uncertainty is not experienced as imposing irreversibility.

The politics of persuasion also affects whose knowledge is treated as relevant [53]. Place-based knowledge about local ecological patterns, cultural meaning, or lived experience of noise and disturbance may be discounted as anecdotal compared to consultant reports. This discounting can weaken relational durability because communities interpret it as disrespect or exclusion. Repairable governance does not require treating all claims as equally authoritative, but it does require creating channels through which local knowledge can shape monitoring design and response priorities. Otherwise, repair becomes a technical exercise that fails to address the social sources of dispute [54].

In addition, persuasion influences how regulators position themselves. Regulators often face contradictory expectations: to facilitate transition goals while protecting environmental and social values. Under sustained contestation, regulators may adopt more assertive stances as a form of institutional self-protection and mission alignment. A qualitative case study of an environmental regulators evolving stance toward wind energy illustrates how an environmental ministrys position can shift through interactions with other agencies, developers, NGOs, and local communities, culminating in a strong oppositional stance justified by ecological concerns and strategic efforts to reinforce regulatory authority, even as wind promotion continues under increased scrutiny [55]. This highlights a maintenance mechanism: when repair demands accumulate and when trust is fragile, regulators may attempt interpretive and procedural repair by tightening scrutiny and reframing the acceptable balance between clean-energy benefits and ecological protection [56]. Such shifts can restore some legitimacy but can also increase uncertainty for investment if they appear abrupt or unpredictable. Repairable transitions therefore require ways to institutionalize repair so that stance shifts occur through transparent, rule-bound processes rather than through episodic hardening.

The persuasion and influence dynamics described here do not imply that regulators are passive recipients of lobbying or that communities are powerless. They imply that repair pathways are

Table 5 Delegated oversight: risks and repair-oriented design responses

Delegation issue	Governance risks	Repair-supportive responses
Consultant-driven assessment	Perceived bias, limited ownership of evidence by affected publics	Independent review capacity, transparent methods, public-interest expertise funds
Contractor-led monitoring	Doubts about compliance data credibility and timely disclosure	Separation of measurement and adjudication, standardized public indicators
Private standard-setting	Drift of norms toward convenience for powerful actors	Clear public mandates, participatory standard revision, periodic audits
Capacity gaps in agencies	Overreliance on intermediaries for interpretation and judgment	Targeted internal expertise, training, and selective insourcing
Opaque roles and incentives	Confusion over who is responsible for follow-through	Publicly mapped oversight architecture and accountability chains

political and that fairness in repair requires institutional attention to who can speak credibly, who can sustain engagement, and how frames are translated into enforceable commitments [57]. The final substantive section turns these insights into design principles for governance arrangements that make repair routine, contestable, and socially durable.

6. Designing for Repairability: From Crisis Cycles to Routine Maintenance

If repair is inevitable, governance systems should be designed to perform it routinely rather than episodically. The objective is not to eliminate disagreement, but to reduce repeated crisis cycles in which every controversy triggers ad hoc tightening, litigation, or politicized intervention [58]. Repairable transitions seek to preserve democratic contestability while providing predictable pathways for learning and adjustment.

A foundational design principle is standing after approval. Standing means that affected publics retain a recognized ability to trigger review under defined conditions and to receive reasoned responses. Standing is not a veto over operations; it is a guarantee that accountability does not end at permit issuance [59]. Standing supports repairability by reducing front-loaded resistance, because stakeholders know that repair can occur without escalating to courts or political arenas. Standing also helps developers by reducing the incentive for opponents to pursue maximalist opposition, because repair pathways exist that can address credible concerns.

A second principle is coupling monitoring to response. Monitoring alone is not repair; it is observation [60]. Repairability requires that observation be embedded in response ladders that specify what happens when thresholds are exceeded or when commitments are not met. Response ladders clarify responsibilities, timelines, and consequences. They reduce cynicism by demonstrating that conditions are enforceable. They also protect developers by making enforcement predictable rather than discretionary [61]. In repairable governance, response is not improvised; it is institutionalized.

A third principle is calibrated transparency oriented toward contestability. Repairable systems must provide enough transparency for actors to contest claims and to understand reasons, without assuming that raw data disclosure alone produces trust. Calibrated transparency emphasizes interpretable public reporting of commitments, compliance status, and trends, combined with independent verification of sensitive or complex data [62]. This approach addresses credibility gaps created by delegated oversight by making verification visible while avoiding indiscriminate disclosure that can overwhelm or expose sensitive information. It also supports interpretive repair by making method choices and uncertainties explicit enough to be debated.

A fourth principle is governing delegation as assurance rather than as outsourcing. Delegation becomes repair-supportive when independence and accountability are designed into intermediary roles [63]. Independence safeguards, conflict-of-interest rules, and clear separation between those who measure and those who adjudicate can reduce suspicion. The maintenance problem identified in privatized governance is not merely that private actors are involved, but that interdependence can undermine transparency and independence if oversight is weak [38]. Repairable transitions respond by strengthening public oversight capacity and by making private roles legible and contestable. This includes ensuring that public agencies retain interpretive capacity rather than outsourcing meaning-making

Table 6 Persuasion and unequal influence in shaping repair pathways

Arena	Actors with structural advantages	Dominant framing strategies	Potential distortion
Regulatory pitching	Large developers, technology suppliers	Innovation, system need, urgency, manageability of risk	Repairs framed as minor tweaks rather than substantive concessions
Local contestation	Organized communities, NGOs	Place attachment, equity, ecological integrity	Repairs framed as moral absolutes, limited negotiation space
Inter-agency bargaining	Central ministries, system operators	Mandate protection, security, reliability	Ecological or local concerns subordinated to system logics
Expert advisory spaces	Consultants, academic experts	Methodological rigor, best practice	Lay and experiential knowledge discounted as anecdotal
Legislative and media arenas	Politicians, national NGOs	Crisis narratives, exemplary cases	One-off failures overgeneralized into system-wide judgments

entirely.

A fifth principle is portfolio-level learning and cumulative governance [64]. Repairable transitions must operate at corridor and portfolio scales because many impacts and legitimacy dynamics are cumulative. Project-by-project repair can become repetitive and inefficient if each project renegotiates the same issues without shared learning. Portfolio-level arrangements can stabilize expectations by creating shared baselines, standardized monitoring indicators, and coordinated mitigation strategies where appropriate [65]. They can also improve distributive durability by making cumulative burdens and benefits visible and negotiable across communities. Without portfolio-level learning, repair occurs through repeated controversy, and institutions tighten standards through crisis rather than through systematic review.

A sixth principle is integrating adaptation and resilience into repair routines. When renewables are linked to resilience, governance should specify how hazard conditions affect operations, how local and system-level resilience benefits are understood, and how trade-offs are revisited as climate risks evolve [66]. The challenge identified in adaptation policy discussions is not only whether renewables appear in policy documents, but how deployment aligns with mitigation objectives while responding to climate-related concerns and implementation limitations [67]. Repairable transitions treat these concerns as ongoing governance tasks, addressed through review windows and operational commitments rather than through broad narratives.

A final principle is reason-giving as maintenance practice. Repair decisions must be accompanied by reasons that actors can contest. Reason-giving supports legitimacy by shifting disputes from suspicion to argument [68]. It also builds institutional memory, allowing future decisions to draw on documented rationales rather than reinventing standards under pressure. Reason-giving is especially important when regulators tighten or relax interpretations, because abrupt shifts without explanation erode trust and increase strategic behavior. Making repair reasons traceable also reduces the power of persuasion alone by requiring that decisions be justified in terms that can be publicly evaluated.

These principles aim to create a governance environment in which repair is routine and rule-bound [69]. Routine repair does not imply constant change; it implies predictable opportunities for adjustment and correction. Rule-bound repair reduces arbitrariness and thus protects both affected publics and investors. When repair is institutionalized, procedural debates about speed versus diligence become less polarizing because the system can proceed under uncertainty while preserving credible correction mechanisms. Repairable transitions therefore offer a pathway to acceleration that is grounded in durability rather than in coercive closure [70].

7. Conclusion

Renewable energy transitions are not only programs of construction; they are long-term projects of governance that must remain

Table 7 Comparing crisis-driven governance and repairable governance

Dimension	Crisis-driven pattern	Repairable pattern
Temporal logic	Long stasis punctuated by emergencies and abrupt reforms	Regular review windows and incremental adjustments
Treatment of uncertainty	Pressure to resolve ex ante or ignore	Acknowledged explicitly, with predefined adjustment routes
Post-approval standing	De facto closure; recourse mainly through courts or politics	Formal standing for affected publics under specified triggers
Use of monitoring	Data accumulation with weak links to enforcement	Monitoring directly tied to response ladders and sanctions
Rule stability	Oscillating tightening and relaxation after high-profile disputes	Predictable, rule-bound evolution informed by portfolio learning

workable under contestation, cumulative impacts, and changing baselines. This paper has proposed a social science theory of repairable transitions that treats repair work as a normal and necessary feature of renewable deployment. It argued that repair work takes material, procedural, and interpretive forms and is triggered when commitments, evidence credibility, or authority alignments fail to hold. Rather than assuming that better communication or more procedure will resolve disputes, the repairability perspective emphasizes institutional capacities to diagnose breakdowns, allocate responsibility, and revise commitments transparently without erasing accountability [71].

The paper showed why repair becomes inevitable in deployment settings characterized by long project horizons, cumulative effects, nonstationarity, fragmented authority, and expanded narratives about resilience. It analyzed how delegated oversight can both enable and undermine repair, highlighting governance concerns about transparency, accountability, and public oversight independence when regulatory responsibilities shift toward private entities. It examined persuasion and unequal influence as forces that shape which repairs are considered acceptable, noting that well-resourced actors may gain advantage in influencing regulators through strategic pitching and framing. and that regulators themselves may evolve their stances under legitimacy pressures and ecological concern, tightening scrutiny and reinterpreting acceptable trade-offs [72]. It also emphasized that incorporating renewables into adaptation agendas raises the stakes of follow-through and requires alignment between mitigation objectives and climate-related concerns in implementation.

The design implications emphasized building governance systems that can perform repair routinely: standing after approval, monitoring coupled to response, calibrated transparency oriented toward contestability, delegation governed as assurance, portfolio-level learning for cumulative effects, operationalized resilience commitments, and traceable reason-giving that supports institutional memory. These measures do not eliminate disagreement and are not substitutes for distributive politics. They aim to reduce repeated crisis cycles by making correction and revision governable, thereby supporting a transition that is not merely fast but socially durable [73].

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